Preface
I once worked at Air Combat Command (ACC) headquarters helping to put together its fiscal year 2000 budget request (FY00 POM). We tried to use computer models and simulations to optimize our funding decisions and understand the impacts of our shortfalls. We wanted to know, for example, should ACC focus on upgrading its weapons, or the infrastructure for supplying and sustaining those weapons? If we can't afford both, what's the impact of choosing one over the other on our ability to fly, fight and win? We asked our analysis/wargaming people to help answer these types of questions, but even with their state of the art equipment, they simply didn't have the tools to provide good answers.
Advances in computers and information management have placed us in the middle of a revolution in military affairs. Computer-based wargames, with their tremendous data processing capabilities, should be at the center of this revolution, crunching the numbers and helping us understand the complicated business of war. The problem is that war is about people. To understand war you have to understand how people think. This paper is about strategic effects; it is about wargames; but most of all it is about the thought processes behind the strategic decisions. Special thanks to the Major Kevin Cole, Air Force Doctrine Center, and Matt Caffrey, Air Command and Staff College, without whose assistance this paper would not be possible.
Introduction
Although the process of warfare is still clouded by obscurity and confused by myths, sense can be made of it nevertheless.
-James F. Dunnigan, author of How to Make War
Strategic effects are the impacts that the outcomes from wartime operational and tactical events have on the highest level decision-makers. A specific strategic environment exists at the outbreak of war in which both sides engaged in conflict are the key players. Operational and tactical events, such as invasions and urban bombings, create outcomes which change the strategic environment. These outcomes become strategic effects when they carry important meaning to primary decision-makers.
Meaning is the key word here. Different people may view a single outcome differently, and consequently react differently. What causes one national leader to feel compelled to impose his will on another? What convinces another to continue to fight to the bitter end rather than yield? Is there a better way to understand meaning in terms of how national leaders need to think in order to do their jobs? An artificial intelligence programmer once said the problem with people is they are much better at expressing what they think than they are at explaining how they think.
i Is it possible to understand the calculus of the person-in-charge? If so, can this calculus be incorporated into a wargame?
JCS Pub 1-02 defines wargames as "a simulation, by whatever means, of a military operation involving two or more opposing forces, using rules, data, and procedures designed to depict an actual or assumed real-life situation." ii Wargames are great tools for helping one understand war without the drawbacks of learning through actual experience. Wargames are especially good at simulating physical interactions between military machines. The student of war can theorize how one weapon system will fare against another, and the wargame can test it. Wargames are also good at understanding some of the more human aspects of war. Opposing players using similar weapon systems can develop strategies for achieving desired outcomes at the other's expense. Nor do wargames need two players to achieve this benefit. Some wargames allow a single person to play "against the computer." In this case the wargame not only models the physical science of military machine against military machines, but the psychology of a human using strategy against strategy. Wargames are very good when they deal with something their programmers understand well, like the physical sciences. They are not as good when dealing with something less well understood, like the thinking of a person.
Fidelity is the degree of realism demonstrated by the wargame. Wargames tend to be most realistic when they focus on the physical processes of war rather than the psychological. Tactical wargames focus somewhat less on human factors than on those aspects of war "where the rubber meets the road," and so tend to be very realistic.
Operational (campaign) wargames deal not only with multiple, simultaneous tactical interactions, but they also introduce an almost equal amount of strategy (psychology) in the person of the opposing force commander (real or simulated). Though it is true a doctrinally and culturally representative opposing force commander would improve overall fidelity, the operational wargame does not require it since it still is primarily about the interaction of physical force. Strategic wargames, however, are ultimately much more about strategy (psychology) than physical science. In strategic wargames, the decision-making process holds center stage, not the dynamics of the battlefield. This means strategic wargames have a built-in fidelity obstacle to overcome: they have to model and simulate processes that are less well understood than those of tactical or operational wargames. 
Theoretical Foundation for a Strategic Effects Model
"The facts will eventually test all our theories, and they form, after all, the only impartial jury to which we can appeal" -Jean Agassiz, author of Geological Sketches (1870) Wargames don't reflect reality so much as they model our understanding of reality.
A strategic wargame requires two things: 1) a good understanding of decision-making processes; and 2) a means for quantifying them. The following two chapters deal primarily with quantifying reality. This chapter deals strictly with understanding it.
Specifically this chapter will review the relevant strategic effect aspects contained in the theories of Thomas Schelling, Robert Pape, and John Warden. The goal is to find common ideas useful to the development of a strategic effects model. One important caveat before starting. Due to space constraints the views of Schelling, Pape, and Warden are greatly condensed and filtered in order to fit into this paper. The author assumes responsibility for the degree of accuracy with which their theories are presented.
Thomas Schelling and Arms and Influence
Schelling wrote this book thirty-three years ago and it still frequently quoted for its ideas on how military force can be used (or not used) to achieve desired strategic objectives. Influence rather than destruction for destruction's sake is the essence of Schelling. He used the word "compellence" to describe convincing one's wartime opponent to change switch from adversarial behavior to that of accommodation.
i Other writers use the term coercion to mean the same thing.
ii Regardless of the term used, Schelling showed that frequently the best way to win is to threaten more than you deliver
and deliver only what is required to threaten credibly.
Threatening works when military force is viewed by one's opponent as a source of "pain" which can only be stopped through yielding. The secret then is to use just enough military power (or any other instrument of power) to hurt the opponent and make threats 
Robert Pape and Bombing to Win
Pape argues that for coercive (compellence) purposes, the most important strategic effect mechanism is the opponent's cost-benefit analysis, especially as it relates to the "military ability to achieve its territorial or other political objectives." vii In other words, the opponent is willing to pay a price to get something of value provided the benefits outweigh the costs. The key mechanism for realizing those benefits at an acceptable cost is relative military power. The opponent embarks on a war strategy believing it has sufficient military power to achieve its objectives. Once it determines that it cannot achieve those objectives, and/or the projected costs are becoming too great, then the opponent is strongly motivated to "cut his losses." Pape calls this denial theory. viii Here strategic effects deal with the availability of sufficient military resources to achieve the objective.
Adding some complexity to this equation is the cost associated with surrender.
Frequently this means the opponent loses political power and may even mean getting tried as a war criminal. The opponent will weigh the costs of continuing to fight against those of accommodation and will chose the option which costs least. Strategic effects then becomes a two part problem of relating operational outcomes associated with fighting against those associated with surrendering. The bottom line with denial theory is it requires the "ability to undermine the target state's confidence in its own military strategy…Once a state is persuaded that objectives cannot be achieved, levels of costs that were bearable as long as there was a chance of success become intolerable. The target then concedes in order to avoid suffering further losses to no purpose." Whoever first reaches a solution of less than or equal to zero will have incentive to end the conflict. An added benefit of this formula is the fact it doesn't need perfect cost or benefit information. The probabilities are the key variables. Even if both cost and benefit equal 1, a low probability of achieving an objective minus a high probability of incurring cost can capture the denial strategic effect of coercion. The side losing the requisite amount of military effectiveness first loses the war.
The problem with denial theory is it focuses too much on force-on-force military operations. Benefits and costs should certainly be a big part of a strategic effects model, but what about the root causes of war? Just because an opponent is forced to give up on its original strategy doesn't mean it won't try again with another strategy once it is strong enough. This situation occurred between World War I and World War II with Germany, and it could be happening now with Iraq. Where does the cost-benefit model fit with regards to the economic, diplomatic, political, moral, and cultural aspects of war? Don't these areas count? The next theorist argues they do but within the framework of the opponent operating as a system.
John Warden and "Success in Modern War"
John Warden views the opponent as a system converting inputs into outputs. The inputs can include many things, but the output is survival. xi For this discussion the system will be the state. The state is made up of five elements, or rings, which are related hierarchically. The five rings consist of population, fielded forces, infrastructure, key production/energy conversion, and leadership.
xii
Figure 2. Warden's Five Rings
Consistent with Schelling, the state has people as its core element, though in the fourth ring. Consistent with Pape, the state has a military for providing security for its people, though in the fifth ring. What's more important than population and fielded forces to the state's survival? One step up in the third ring is the infrastructure for helping people work more efficiently; that is,roads, bridges, schools, factories, legal institutions, banks, et cetera. Key production are the energy sources the state needs to make everything work smoothly-hydro, electrical, carbon-based fuel, and so forth.
Providing the guidance to make all this work smoothly in the first ring is the state leadership. The more important the element, the less damage it can sustain before the state stops producing its own survival. Related to compellence and cost-benefit analysis, an opponent state must sue for peace once it recognizes a credible threat to one or more of these rings, or risk ceasing to exist as a state. Different from punishment and denial, Warden's theory allows strategic effects to occur in outcomes dealing with events other than just attrition of population or fielded forces.
The real benefit of Five Ring Theory is it begins to capture the synergy inherent within a state and the cascading effects that occur when one piece needed to achieve that synergism is removed. All the pieces are interrelated according to weighted their values.
For example a Five Ring strategic effects model wouldn't say a 10% decrease in a state's leadership effectiveness would bring the opponent 10% closer to yielding. Rather it would say something like a 10% decrease in a state's leadership effectiveness also decreases the state's ability to produce/use energy efficiently (perhaps a 10% decrease), which in turn might reduce infrastructure effectiveness (another 10% decrease), which perhaps makes providing food and medicine more difficult (yet another 10% decrease), to add to a decrease in centralized military command (a 10% or greater decrease in operational effectiveness)-all of which makes a 10 decrease in leadership effectiveness add up to a strategic effect of the opponent being 50% closer to accommodation. What is needed is a wargame-friendly theoretical model which combines the insights of punishment, denial, and five-ring theory; but also one which doesn't rely on overwhelming military might; one which takes into account asymmetrical strategic effects; and one which provides some insight into the underlying causes of the conflict.
The next chapter will propose such a model. The following model is an attempt to resolve the problems identified in the previous chapter concerning reliance on overwhelming force, asymmetrical strategic effects, and the underlying causes of war. It builds on the previous strategic theories to produce a model which measures probable achievement of coercion. Finally, and equally important, it allows quantifiable variables in order for a computer-based strategic wargame to be able to employ artificial intelligence routines. For simplicity this chapter will assume war is between two states. Other states may be involved but only as a supplement to the primary actors.
This model is called the Value-Based Strategic Effect Model (VBSEM) because it uses the concept of value as its basis for quantifying relationships. Each side in a conflict continuously estimates its own value, that of its opponent, and that of the object in conflict. The key to VBSEM is understanding how each side views these values. These values can be classified into six variables: starting and current value, forecast benefit, probability of achieving benefit, attractiveness of benefit, current and forecast cost, probability of achieving forecast continued cost., and cost aversion.
VBSEM treats benefit and cost differently than the previous chapter. Here VBSEM treats benefit as achieving an increase in value (positive delta); that is, winning.
Similarly it treats cost as experiencing a decrease in value (negative delta); that is, losing.
Yet winning and losing don't necessarily mean won and lost. Increases and decreases in value are simply ways to keep score. It is the way that the players respond to winning and losing that determines who coerces and who gets coerced. The first step is determining value.
Value: Starting & Current
The fundamental concept in VBSEM is the idea that each state has a value. Value is important because it is quantifiable. Identifying the appropriate values for each side helps to understand relationships and to keep score. It also allows incorporation of economic models to help minimize the inevitable reinventing of the wheel. Incidentally, this paper will incorporate very simple economic models even though very complex, sophisticated models could conceivably be used to achieve higher levels of accuracy.
VBSEM recognizes two types of value per state: the starting value and the current value. To determine a state's value, the VBSEM determines its power in five areas:
military, political, economic, moral informational, and survival. Once tabulated for each side, the different power areas are compared to note the relative strengths and weaknesses which lead to asymmetrical strategies. The power rating in each area is then normalized and becomes a value rating for that element of power. Another potentially useful aspect of power is its ability to be treated as a zero sum game in certain situations. For example, one side can sometimes increase relative power simply by reducing that of its opponent. As one side moves closer to achieving a monopoly over some type of power, it can control supply dramatically increasing its value in that area.
As stated earlier, in VBSEM there are five types of power. power from a conflict in order to ensure domestic security. These domestic security forces must be subtracted from the total force. If a state has close allies, sometimes it can "borrow" a certain amount of military power from its allies until the end of hostilities.
Borrowed military power is added to the state's indigenous military power. One caution with borrowed power though is it may come with strings attached which could limit the options a state has for pursuing its strategic objectives. These strings could actually reduce power in another area, such as political or moral power. Also, allies may not remain allies for the duration of the war which could change the military power equation
quickly. Finally, relative military power lends itself to zero sum calculations which allows a net loss in one side's force to function as an increase in the other's power.
The value of a state doesn't stop with military power. Each state also has economic power which roughly equates to the state's ability to achieve its strategic objectives through trade. It can also be measured in a number of ways. Here it is measured as a percentage of the world's total GNP normalized.
Political power is next and is often identified with Warden's Five Rings view on the importance of leadership. It roughly equates to the leader's job security. It encompasses both the degree of domestic support for the war from the political elite, and the vulnerability of the political leader to dissent. Usually political power is fairly high early in the conflict. As the war progresses, however, this support can change dramatically. If the political leader is vulnerable to dissent, these changes can have a large strategic effect on the outcome of the war. International support has an additive effect on this power.
Moral informational power refers to cultural support for the war. It equates to public opinion, attitudes and will. Few wars are possible without raising lofty appeals to a common sense of right and wrong. Moral informational power is strongest when the state is culturally homogenous in terms of values so that internal conflict are minimized.
Moral informational power also increases when it has a widespread, multinational, or universal appeal. Obviously religious influence is the most frequent source of moral informational power. Some states, however, try to substitute a secular moral code for
religion. An example here would be a concern for human rights. Finally, moral informational power can have a unique strategic effect on war. For example, military failure can spark a martyrdom, or circle-the-wagons, reaction which actually increases will and prolongs the losing side's involvement. Likewise, military victory can spark a sympathy reaction which decreases will and possibly leads to premature conflict termination.
Survival power is similar to Schelling's view of pain, and is the degree to which a state can feed and care for its people. It can be measured in many ways with one being average life expectancy. How long can the average person expect to survive in a given state? Typically during war resources can become scarce and require redistribution to aid the war effort. As access to food, water, medicine, and energy decreases, progressively more of the general population dies from shortages. A state with an unusually high mortality rate due to lack of food, water, shelter, medicine, or energy can't have much value.
Each of these types of power can be thought of as a measurement of the state's health in its respective area. High economic value equates to a healthy economy. After identifying the military, economic, informational, diplomatic, and survival values for each state in a conflict, the next step is to add these values together to determine each state's total value--starting and current. Once these values become known, determining benefit and cost becomes possible.
Figure 3. VSBEM: "health" of the state directly related to its value

Forecast Benefit
Benefit is the amount of increase in current and/or forecast value above the starting value. In war both sides usually hope to increase their current value above the starting value by some target amount. Benefit provides the reason for starting a fight and for continuing to fight once started. Current benefit is the non-negative difference between starting value and current value. It shows whether or not a state is winning. If current value is below starting value, no benefit is being realized. Realizing no benefit to fighting is not necessarily a reason to yield early in the war. Most states enter war understanding that their value may decline below the starting value for a short period of time. Much like an investor, they are willing to accept a temporary setback if it means in the long run they end up "in the black". This makes forecast benefit more important than current benefit. To determine forecast benefit, the current benefit must be known, and then weighted based on probability of increasing benefit and attractiveness of an increasing benefit. The key to using these variables is determining state value at any given point in time.
As easy as this may (or may not) sound, it's actually very complicated once the war starts because increases in one value area can be offset by decreases in other areas. States typically try to pick simple strategies for improving value that are likely to avoid this problem. One popular strategy is to take valuable territory from another state, especially when that particular territory is rich in economic, survival, and political significance.
Capturing such territory can increase the aggressor's value by decreasing the other side's relative military value, taking its economic resources, taking its survival resources, rallying its people in support, and coercing other states in to adopting its moral view. If other states of the world do not object, the aggressor can reap quite a harvest in value.
Most, if not all, the major powers of the world have successfully employed this strategy at one time or another in their history. On the other hand, if other nations view the aggressors's capture of territory by force as a future threat to their vital interests, they may use it as an excuse to turn the tables and capture his territory. If capturing territory is too risky, increases in value can also come by simply decreasing the other side's value.
For example, assume two militarily powerful states are fighting, neither intends to retain its captured territory, and both are losing an unequal amount of military force. The state that has lost less military force will experience an increase in military value simply because the other side has lost even more force. On the other hand, the state that has gained the most military value might be losing the most total value due to corresponding decreases in economic, moral informational and political value.
Determining current value and forecast benefit is then the result of continuously summing the values of the five value areas for each state. The starting value provides the baseline. Current value relative to the starting value shows whether the state is winning or losing. The magnitude of the difference between current value and starting value for a given unit of time helps show the likelihood that winning will turn into won and losing will turn into lost.
Probability of Achieving Benefit
The benefit or value of fighting depends on the probability of success. Determining it requires the strategic wargame take into account the magnitude and direction of change in each state's current values. Magnitude is the amount of change for a given unit of time. If one side experiences a tremendous positive value change in a short period of time (i.e. Germany, May 1940), it will likely expect that vector to continue to the end of the war. Likewise with a negative vector (France, 1940) . As the war continues, value may fluctuate up and down, but the mean change in value will still be the key vehicle for determining forecast benefit. It isn't enough to just look at the vector in total state value either; an asymmetrical increase in one type of power may eventually negate or even reverse decreases in the other types of power (North Vietnam, 1968 value vectors will become moot-the probability of success will go to zero as well. On the other hand, even if the forecast benefit is positive, a state may still elect to support an early termination to the war simply because it isn't interested in a big increase in value.
Attractiveness of Benefit
Not all states place the same importance on improving their value. Daniel Bernoulli once wrote the "utility resulting from any small increase in wealth will be inversely proportionate to the quantity of goods previously possessed." iii For example, a state at the very high end of the value continuum already has a great deal of value. There isn't much more it can gain (benefit) by involving itself in a war; however, it does have a lot to lose (cost). In this case, the real motivator to a high value state is in not giving ground to an aggressor. This is different than the low value state which has little to lose and everything to gain. Once the benefit (positive difference between starting value current or forecast value) is known, the next step is to determine the attractiveness of this benefit.
A state that is winning (benefit) and is attracted to increasing its value even more (high attractiveness to benefit) may refuse to negotiate with the losing side for anything less than unconditional surrender. Multiplying the variables of benefit, probability of future benefit, and attractiveness of benefit gives the case for continuing the fight. But what about cost?
Cost: Forecast & Current
Up to this point the discussion has centered on the positive increase in current and forecast value relevant to the starting value (the benefit variable in the cost-benefit model because the war will generally end when the loser says it will end; that is, when the loser agrees to the winner's demands. Yet losing does not mean lost. Frequently in war one side will be losing only to turn the corner and ultimately win. All states accept a certain amount of cost early in the war, especially if the magnitude is small.
Probability of Achieving Forecast Continued Cost
Probability of achieving forecast continued cost is simply the negative side of probability of achieving forecast benefit. Like probability-benefit, probability-cost is a function of magnitude-direction data and force available. 
Cost Aversion
The amount of acceptable cost is a function of starting value. The state with a high starting value will be more averse to cost than a low starting value state. iv It literally has "a lot to lose." The low value state, on the other hand, is less cost averse because it has much less to lose; however, the low value state is also much closer to losing all its value.
Once a state loses all its value, it cannot survive--much less fight a war. This degree of cost aversion needs to be weighted into the current costs being experienced by each state.
VBSEM Conclusion
A strategic wargame can use the total values of competing states to understand the players, identify at any given time each state's degree of winning or losing, when the war is likely to conclude, and finally what types of problems each state find itself facing as it struggles for a better state of peace. A model is important because it identifies the processes the wargame should try to emulate. But models are just good ideas until operationalized. To help nudge this model out of the realm of "just another good idea" it needs someone to mechanize it. The next chapter will provide some actual formulas to try and help turn theory into practice. 
Chapter 4 From Model to Wargame
Between the idea and the reality, Between the notion and the act, Falls the Shadow.
T.S. Eliot, poet
Models are nice, but how do you employ them? One way is to include in the strategic wargame an artificial intelligence (AI) module that can make decisions based on rules derived from VBSEM. Ideally the previous chapter would have provided sufficient guidance to get the AI programmer started. If not, this chapter will hopefully provide enough little picture answers to get help the ball rolling. Four computer wargame topics are covered here: players, databases, mechanisms, and a catch-all topic termed fuzzy logic.
Players
Consistent with the Joint Pub definition of a wargame, there should be at least two sides.
Which side should the computer play? The answer could be both, as long as toggles are provided for allowing operator input at any time. Letting the computer play both sides makes the action fairly predictable and easily understood. It also helps keep the operator(s) from getting bogged down with detail. Finally it allows the game to play real-time without continuous assistance from the operator(s). Letting humans take control introduces more irrationality (realism), and flexibility.
Making this question more complex is the interrelationship between a VBSEM-based strategic wargame and operational wargames. A VBSEM strategic wargame needs continuous inputs from an operational wargame (tactical wargame if simulating peacekeeping operations).
These inputs are changes to the strategic environment caused by the operational wargames breaking things (military) or in some other way making changes in order to achieve objectives.
Once it gets these inputs, strategic wargame tracks these changes, readjusts its "thinking," and decides whether or not to provide new guidance to the operational wargames. The operational wargames should also have an artificial intelligence module making operational decisions, and a human override option. Since there can be up to five operational wargames per strategic wargame, more than two players/AI modules could be required.
Databases
One can't have a wargame without a database. A VBSEM strategic wargame should include at least four databases: starting value, power relational, current value, and potential cost/benefit. When an operational wargame indicates a change to either side's starting value, the computer measures the degree of change to the affected power base, modifies the value of the other power bases (if required), sums the new power base values, logs the new current value, modifies the potential cost/benefit database, and finally plots on a scale each side's willingness to continue the war.
Starting values is simply a list of each state's power base values at the start of the game.
These values can be input directly by an operator or can be stored as default settings. These values can be determined in several ways. For example, Trevor Dupuy advocates computing military power by taking the overall number of weapons a country can bring to battle and weighting these weapons individually for their lethality in order to achieve an "overall weapons If survival value decreases due to attacks on food stores, the state will try to redistribute food so that military value remains high even though others may starve. Eventually, however, a continuously decreasing survival value will be felt by the military causing its value to decrease as well. This point is a threshold. The power relational database would then describe the ratio of a further increase in survival power to decrease in military power. This, in turn, must become an input to the operational games supporting the model. It would do this also for the other power base values. For example, if a state's default starting survival power value was 90, then the power relational database might show that a decrease below 75 will cause economic power to decrease at a rate of 1:3, political power at 3:1, military power at 1:2, and moral informational power to increase at a rate of 1:1.5. Should economic power subsequently decrease below 62, then political power will decrease at an additional rate of 2:1,and so on.
The current state value database is simply a holding place for tracking changes in each state's power. Current value is continuously updated and referenced by other parts of the wargame.
The potential cost/benefit database is a list of objectives which can increase (benefit) and decrease (cost) power values, along with their notional value. Like the others, it would have default settings and an operator override. As the game progresses, the perceived value of these objectives will change based on the VBSEM mechanisms used.
Mechanisms
If determining value is the most challenging part of creating a strategic wargame, proposing mechanisms for utilizing that data is probably the most contentious. Basically a strategic wargame should utilize at least four mechanisms: a benefit calculation mechanism, an operational hand-off mechanism, a cost calculation mechanism, and a termination mechanism.
The benefit calculation mechanism takes objectives from the potential cost/benefit database and modifies them according to Degree of Attractiveness and Probability of Achieving Benefit (see previous chapter). Degree of Attractiveness is a function of current value (Bernoulli).
Probability of Achieving Benefit is a function of power advantages relative to the enemy and historical rate/direction of changes. If one side's Degree of Attractiveness and Probability of Achieving Benefit are both high, that player will likely not settle for anything short of unconditional surrender. If both were low, that player will probably want to negotiate a truce and this information would be passed to the termination mechanism. For example, assume one player has a relatively low overall starting value (high benefit attractiveness), views the harbors in the other side's territory as lucrative (potential cost/benefit database), and has a large military military power advantage over its opponent (high probability of achieving benefit). The benefit calculation mechanism should tell the operational wargame to seize those harbors.
The operational hand-off mechanism is simply the interface between the strategic and the operational wargames. Through it the strategic wargame provides objectives/guidance and receives outcome information. Ideally it should be able to hand-off objectives/guidance and receive inputs to all five operational wargames concurrently.
The cost calculation mechanism is the negative side of the benefit calculation mechanism. It takes inputs indicating decreasing value from the operational wargames and determines readiness for war termination. It is a function of current value, Cost Aversion, and Probability of Achieving Forecast Continued Cost (previous chapter). If losing beyond a certain threshold, the cost calculation mechanism will see that state as desiring war termination at the earliest opportunity, and will notify the termination mechanism.
The termination mechanism simply plots and compares each side's willingness to end the war. The war ends either when both sides send a willingness to end message, or as soon as one side reaches the minimum possible current value. Once the war is terminated, the computer should revisit each state's current value to determine winner and loser. It should then review the final potential benefit database to identify potential future causes of conflict.
Fuzzy Logic
Three more issues must be addressed before leaving this chapter: scope, probability, and lessons learned. All the discussion thus far has focused on two states fighting a war. A far more interesting and useful strategic wargame would increase the scope of the model to include the motivations of the other states within the region, to include coalition partners. Many if not all of these states will identify at least some of their current value with the fortunes of one of the antagonists; consequently, they will be initially motivated to help, hurt, or remain neutral. As the war progresses, however, they may decide to step in, step out or even change alliances. All of these decisions will be made based on a calculus of value and should be included in the wargame.
Probability should incorporated as much as possible into a strategic wargame. War is as much an art as a science. Information doesn't always come to decision makers immediately after an event in complete, objective packages. Even if they did, many times leaders hear what they want to hear and believe what they want to believe. The mechanisms identified above should incorporate a probability factor to account for the possibility that an actor could be receiving faulty information. If the termination mechanism would ordinarily indicate deterministically that a state should sue for peace immediately, it should be modified based on an operator input level of probable access to reliable information. For example, if the operator believes the opponent will have good but not perfect access to information, the termination mechanism should indicate a 90% probability of him or her choosing the computer suggested outcome, and a 10% chance of choosing another outcome picked randomly.
Finally, the most important part of the strategic wargame needs to answer is the lessons learned. A strategic wargame must be transparent enough to readily answer the "why" questions that will inevitably come up. Why did the opponent choose to negotiate war termination when it was clearly winning and able to achieve its opponent's most valuable objective? No wargame replicates the real world perfectly. To be truly useful the operator must be able to differentiate the valid lessons learned from the invalid.
Conclusions
"But war's a game, which, were their subjects wise, Kings would not play at."
It is much better to make mistakes in a wargame than in an actual war. This is particularly true at the strategic level. No one has a perfect understanding of war at the strategic level.
Numerous theories exist but it is difficult to apply them reliably across the spectrum of war.
Improving the fidelity of strategic wargames would help test theory, improve understandings, and prevent mistakes from occurring during the real thing.
This paper reviewed some of the current theories on strategic warfare, proposed a model of strategic effects, and offered ideas for incorporating that model into a strategic wargame. The next step would be to actually write the code and put the model into a wargame to test it. This, or something similar, needs to be done. War at the strategic level is far too important a process to trivialize its learning. 
